Single-Database Private Information Retrieval Protocols~: Overview, Usability and Trends by Aguilar Melchor, Carlos & Gaborit, Philippe
Single-Database Private Information Retrieval
Protocols : Overview, Usability and Trends
Carlos Aguilar Melchor, Philippe Gaborit
To cite this version:
Carlos Aguilar Melchor, Philippe Gaborit. Single-Database Private Information Retrieval Pro-
tocols : Overview, Usability and Trends. [Research Report] 2007, pp.11. <inria-00134415>
HAL Id: inria-00134415
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00134415
Submitted on 2 Mar 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1Single-Database Private Information Retrieval
Protocols : Overview, Usability and Trends.
Carlos Aguilar Melchor and Philippe Gaborit
Abstract—A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) scheme is
a protocol in which a user retrieves a record out of N from a
replicated database, while hiding from the database which record
has been retrieved, as long as the different replicas do not collude.
A specially interesting sub-field of research, called single-
database PIR, deals with the schemes that allow a user to
retrieve privately an element of a non-replicated database. In
these schemes, user privacy is related to the intractability of a
mathematical problem, instead of based on the assumption that
different replicas exist and do not collude against their users.
Single-database and replicated-database PIR schemes have
generated an enormous amount of research in the privacy
protection field during the last two decades. However, many
scientists believe, specially for single-database PIR schemes, that
these are theoretical tools unusable in almost any situation. It is
true that these schemes usually require the database to use an
enormous amount of computational power, but considering the
huge amount of applications these protocols have, it is important
to evaluate precisely their usability.
We present in this article an overview of the current single-
database PIR schemes through the innovations they have brought
to this field of research. This gives a unified view of the evolution
since the first of these schemes was presented by Kushilevitz and
Ostrovsky in 1997 and up to the latest trends in single-database
PIR research such as trusted hardware usage, and noise-based
schemes. Then, we compare the most representative of these
schemes with a single set of communication and computational
performance measures. We highlight that practical usability of
PIR schemes is not as dependent on communication performance
as the literature suggests, and that a trade-off between commu-
nication and computation leads to much more versatile schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Usually, to retrieve an element from a database, a user will send
a request pointing out which element he wants to obtain, and the
database will send back the requested element. Which element
a user is interested in may be an information he would like to
keep secret, even for the database administrators. For example,
the database may be :
• an electronic library, and which books we are interested
in may provide information about our politic or religious
beliefs, or other details about our personality it may be
desirable to keep confidential,
• stock exchange share prices, and the clients may be investors
reluctant to divulge which share they are interested in,
• a pharmaceutical database, and some client laboratories may
wish that nobody may learn which are the active principles
they may want to use,
To protect his privacy, a user accessing a database may there-
fore want to retrieve an element without revealing which element
he is interested in. A trivial solution is for the user to download the
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entire database and retrieve locally the element he wants to obtain.
This is usually unacceptable if the database is too large (for
example, an electronic library), quickly obsolete (for example,
stock exchange share prices), or confidential (for example, a
pharmaceutical database).
Private Information Retrieval (PIR for short) schemes aim to
provide the same confidentiality to the user (on which element is
requested) than downloading the entire database, with sub-linear
communication cost. PIR was introduced by Chor, Goldreich,
Kushilevitz, and Sudan in 1995 [1]. In their paper, they proposed
a set of schemes to implement PIR through replicated databases,
which provide users with information-theoretic security as long
as some of the database replicas do not collude against the users.
Remark that PIR schemes do not ensure database confidential-
ity: a user may retrieve more than a single database element with
a PIR scheme without the database learning it. A PIR scheme
ensuring that users retrieve a single database element with each
query is called a Symmetric PIR (or SPIR) scheme.
In this paper, we will focus on PIR schemes that do not need
the database to be replicated, which are usually called single-
database PIR schemes. Users’ privacy in these schemes is ensured
only against computationally-bounded attackers. It is in fact
proved that there exists no information-theoretically secure single-
database PIR scheme with sub-linear communication cost [1].
A field of research closely related to PIR is the one of Oblivious
Transfer [2]. Oblivious Transfer schemes are single-database
SPIR schemes except that they aim to limit the computational
cost for the user and the database regardless of communication
cost. In such schemes, an encrypted version of the whole database
is usually sent to the user. Oblivious Transfer is a fundamental
cryptographic primitive mostly used in theoretical proofs, the
most interesting application being probably that it is complete
for secure multi-party computation [3]. As Oblivious Transfer
schemes are mainly theoretical tools and answer to different issues
than single-database PIR schemes we will not deal with them in
this paper.
The first single-database PIR scheme was presented in 1997
by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky, and since then improved schemes
have been proposed by different authors [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].
All of these schemes follow a similar approach, but it is
difficult to understand which are the innovations brought by each
of them, and the impact that the different innovations have on
communication and computational performance. We present in
this paper the fundamental approach that all of these schemes
follow, and indicate why each of them has meant a step forward.
Single-database PIR schemes are computationally expensive.
Indeed, in order to answer a query, the database must process all
of its entries. If in a given protocol it does not process some
entries, the database will learn that the user is not interested
in them. This would reveal to the database partial information
on which entry the user is interested in, and therefore is not as
2private as downloading the whole database and retrieving locally
the desired entry.
The computational cost for the server is therefore linear on the
database size. Moreover, current schemes have a very expensive
cost per bit in the database, a multiplication over a large modulus.
This limits both the database size and the throughput shared by
the users, limiting as well their usage for many databases as for
other applications such as low-latency unobservable communica-
tions [10] or private keyword search [11]. As a consequence, all
of the current single-database PIR schemes are unusable in many
applications as it will be shown in section V.
Efforts have been done to reduce the computational cost of
the database through the use of trusted hardware [12], [13]. The
resulting protocols greatly reduce the computational cost and
provide optimal communication cost. However, the computation
is done by the trusted hardware, which is much slower than usual
hardware. Therefore, even for moderate sizes of the database the
computation time remains too large for many applications.
Finally, in a recent work [14] the authors present a noise-
based approach. This protocol has not as good communication
performance as other single-database PIR schemes, and bases its
security on lattices and NTRU-like [15] scrambling assumptions,
instead of on number-theoretic intractability reductions. However,
it seems difficult to find a scheme that has low computation
and communication costs under strong assumptions, despite the
interest these protocols awake in the research community. We
believe that the approach we presented in [14] is an interesting
alternative to number-theory. Thorough study and validation by
the research community of noise-based schemes can open the path
to single-database PIR schemes usable in a much broader span
of applications than the one we can currently reach. Even if this
protocol has not been validated by the research community, we
present here its performance to show the impact such a scheme
can have in PIR applications.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we present
a complete survey and concept analysis of the existing single-
database PIR schemes. In [16], Gasarch’s presents a survey of
general PIR schemes, including replicated database schemes,
primitives implying and implied by the existence of PIR schemes,
theoretic bounds and many other subjects among which single-
database PIR is only mentioned but no survey of these schemes
is really done. Very recently (in fact in parallel with our work)
Ostrovsky and Skeith [?] as eprint a transcription of an invited
talk to PKC 2007, which surveys single-database PIR schemes
but their paper is limited to the description of number theory
based PIR schemes and does not consider performances of these
schemes. We believe that single-database PIR schemes deserve
their own survey for three reasons:
• the number of publications on this subject is large enough,
• this variant is specially interesting as forcing the database
to be replicated and supposing that the different replicas do
not collude (as it is done in general PIR schemes) is very
restrictive,
• the different papers on this research field are often highly
technical, have led to re-discoveries, and performance issues
are often neglected or evaluated with many different sets of
measures.
Indeed, most of the papers on single-database PIR research
use many common techniques such as recursion or agglomeration
(see section II) mixed with their own innovations and it is often
difficult to know what is the real contribution of a given scheme
and evaluate its impact on performance. In this survey, we isolate
transversal techniques that are usable for any single-database
PIR scheme and present each protocol through the innovations
it brings to the PIR research field. We also use a unified set
of measures to compare from a communication and computation
point of view the performances attainable with each of these
protocols.
The second major contribution of this paper is to highlight that
computational cost is and will probably remain so high in the
near future that communication-efficiency in classical schemes
is pointless for practical applications. Indeed, the throughput a
server can provide to a user is so small when compared with
today available bandwidths, even over the Internet, that having
a large expansion factor on the communication cost would have
a very small impact on bandwidth usage. We show that other,
less communication efficient solutions can provide much better
trade-offs between communication and computation. Such trade-
offs do not appear to be attainable through number-theory, but a
noise-based approach seems to bring this possibility.
The paper is organized as follows: in section II we introduce
some basic concepts and transversal techniques usable by any
PIR scheme. In section III we present an overview of the
current single-database PIR schemes. The communication and
computational performance analysis of these schemes is done in
sections IV and V, and section VI brings the trends analysis.
Finally, we conclude in section VII.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS AND COMMON TECHNIQUES
We describe a database as a set of n l-bit elements. PIR requests
are usually formed of a set of n query elements, one per each
database element. Each of these query elements is combined with
the database element it is associated to, and then the results are
combined between them to obtain the PIR reply.
Because of this common approach, some techniques can be
used with all the existing PIR schemes. In this section we present
first how it is possible to adapt any scheme for any database
element size, and second how the recursive usage of PIR schemes
leads to much more versatile protocols.
A. Iterative reply generation
It is straightforward to adapt a single-database PIR protocol
to any value of l. For example, if a given single-database PIR
scheme allows to recover one-bit elements from a database, it
can also used to obtain 2-bit elements. When the user sends the
PIR request to the database, this one will operate as follows :
• it generates a PIR reply by using the request over the set of
n 1-bit elements formed by the first bit of each element in
the database,
• it generates a second PIR reply by using the same request
over the set of n 1-bit elements formed by the second bit of
each element in the database.
Of course, this can be generalized to elements of any size and
schemes allowing to retrieve chunks of information of arbitrary
size. This is possible because the requests generated by the single-
database PIR schemes are always independent from the database
contents. When l is larger than the chunk size a scheme allows
to retrieve, we will say that the database replies iteratively until
the entire l-bit element is sent.
3B. Database elements aggregation
When a scheme allows to retrieve chunks of information larger
than α× l bits, α being an integer constant and l being the size
of the database elements, a trivial improvement can be done: the
database can be seen as composed of n/α elements of size α× l.
This does not increase the database reply size and lowers the
query size as just n/α query elements are needed instead of n.
As this improvement is common to all schemes and is application
dependent (as it depends on the database element size), we will
not include it on the final performance results, letting the reader
evaluate it for her/his own application.
C. Load balancing and recursive usage
If the user sends n query elements and the database a PIR reply,
the total communication cost is O(n). To reduce this cost, it is
possible to use a load balancing technique which was originally
presented in the seminal paper about PIR [1]. The idea is to see
the n-element database as a matrix of
√
n lines and
√
n columns
each scalar in the matrix being a database element. The user sends√
n query elements, one for every column in the matrix, and the
database replies iteratively sending back
√
n PIR replies, one for
each line in the matrix. As Figure 1 shows, with such an approach,
the user retrieves a full column of data, containing the element
he is interested in with total communication cost in O(
√
n).
Fig. 1. Load balancing.
When representing the database as a matrix, instead of using
the load balancing technique, it is possible to use the PIR scheme
recursively as Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky proposed in [17]. The
recursive usage of PIR schemes allows to lower the size of PIR
requests while increasing the size of the PIR reply in a very
versatile way. The main idea is that using the load balancing
technique database obtains
√
n PIR replies and each of them can
be seen as an element of a virtual database. The user can therefore
send a second query to retrieve one of the replies issued from the
load balancing process.
Fig. 2. Recursive usage of a PIR scheme.
In figure 2, we go back to the example given in figure 1 : the
first recursion results in three PIR replies that are used as a virtual
database for the second recursion. As with the load balancing
technique, when recursion is used the query size shrinks (from
O(n) to O(n1/2)), and the reply size increases.
This approach is much more interesting than the load balancing
technique for two reasons. The first one was not obvious at the
time the scheme was proposed, and comes from the fact that some
schemes can implement the recursion in a very efficient way as we
will show later. The second reason is that load balancing may be
done just once, representing the database as a matrix. Recursion
can be done as many times as the number of dimensions that the
database representation has.
If the database is represented as a cube of size n1/3, the user
will send three queries with n1/3 elements each. The database
will compute a matrix of n1/3 × n1/3 PIR replies from the first
query. This matrix can be seen as a virtual database and the
second query will be used to retrieve one column of n1/3 PIR
replies. This column will also be used as a virtual database of
n1/3 elements, and the third query will be used to obtain the PIR
reply containing the element the user is interested in. Generally,
if the database is represented by a d-dimension hyper-cube, d
recursions are possible. With such a representation the user will
send d requests, each composed of only n1/d residues. This allows
a user to shrink greatly the queries’ size, but the size of the PIR
replies increases quickly (exponentially in most cases) in d. A
trade-off must be made, depending on the application the PIR
scheme is used for.
Some PIR schemes [9], [13] do a long pre-computation over
the database contents before answering to the PIR queries.
Sometimes this pre-computation is mandatory for the scheme
to work properly [9], other times it just brings a performance
improvement [13]. When using recursion, pre-computation cannot
be done over the virtual intermediate databases, as they depend on
the users’ first queries, and therefore these two techniques are in-
compatible. Whenever a scheme has a phase of pre-computation,
we will thus not consider the usage of recursion.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING SINGLE-DATABASE PIR
SCHEMES
A. Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky’s scheme
In [17], Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky created the first single-
database PIR scheme, by using quadratic residues. What exactly
are quadratic residues is not as important as their properties:
• the user can efficiently generate numbers which are quadratic
residues (QRs) and numbers which are quadratic non
residues (QNRs),
• the user can efficiently test if a number is a QR or a QNR,
• the user can send sets of such numbers to a database which
will be unable to distinguish QRs from QNRs
• there is an operation OP, computable by such a database,
that from a set of QRs and QNRs gives a QNR if and only
if the number of QNRs in the initial set is odd.
This protocol allows a user to retrieve a single bit. We will
suppose w.l.o.g. that the database is formed of one-bit elements.
If this is not the case, the database will proceed iteratively to send
the requested element. The idea behind this PIR scheme is for the
query to be constituted of one QR number for each element of
the database except for the element to be retrieved and a QNR
number for that element. The database computes the operation
OP over the set of numbers associated with the elements in the
database set to one (and ignores the others), and sends the result
to the user. If the element the user is interested in is set to one
the database will have selected a QNR among the numbers and
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is set to zero, the database will have selected only QRs and the
result of the operation will be a QR. Figure 3 resumes this idea.
Fig. 3. QRs and PIR schemes.
The first contribution of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky is therefore
an approach to make single-database PIR schemes. In his master
thesis [5], Eran Mann formalizes this approach and introduces
the notion of homomorphic trapdoor predicates, which are merely
the predicates having the properties that we have described at the
beginning of this section for quadratic residues. The second major
contribution of Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky’s paper has already
been introduced: the recursive usage of PIR schemes. All of
the current single-database PIR schemes follow the approach
proposed by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky. The different schemes
use homomorphic trapdoor predicate families with properties that
improve significantly the schemes’ performance. But, in each
of them, the approach is to use, recursively if necessary, the
predicates proposed by these authors.
B. Homomorphic encryption based schemes
Apart from the master thesis of Eran Mann, the article by
Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky led to another significant work: a
paper by Julien P. Stern [4], which made a major outbreak.
Stern proposes exactly the same scheme than Kushilevitz and
Ostrovsky, except that, instead of using a trapdoor predicate that
can only encode one bit of information (for example being a
QR or a QNR), he proposes to use homomorphic encryption
algorithms, which have all the properties needed, but can encode
many bits of information in every number resulting from the OP
operation.
In this scheme, instead of sending many QRs and one QNR, the
user sends many encryptions of zero and one encryption of one.
The protocols can be used with any cryptosystem which has two
major properties: indistinguishability and homomorphic encryp-
tion. Indistinguishability ensures that only the user generating the
cyphertexts can distinguish the numbers that are encryptions1 of
zero and the numbers that are encryptions of one. Homomorphic
encryption ensures that the multiplication of two cyphertexts
which are encryptions of two cleartexts a and b, results on an
encryption of a+ b (left side of figure 4).
This multiplication can be iterated into an exponentiation to
absorb a message as shown in the right side of figure 4. If an
encryption of one is raised to the power m it will become an
encryption of m whereas if an encryption of zero is raised to the
power m it will remain an encryption of zero (as 0×m = 0). This
is used by Stern to improve Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky’s scheme
as the database can encode in a cyphertext as many bits as a
1 Note that in such cryptosystems, for a given cleartext many different
cyphertexts exist.
Fig. 4. Homomorphic encryption property.
cleartext can have. Figure 5 shows Stern’s scheme. Note that this
protocol is exactly the same as Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky’s for
one-bit elements as if an element is set to zero, the corresponding
cyphertext will be ignored (as raising to the zero power results
in one, the neutral operand for the multiplication).
Fig. 5. Stern’s scheme.
When users try to retrieve l-bit elements from a database with
l > 1 this scheme is of course very interesting, since every number
sent back can encode many bits contained in the database instead
of one. However, even if the user is interested in receiving a
single bit of information, the possibility to encode many bits in
each number is very interesting. The reason for this is pretty
simple : when using the load balancing technique, or recursion,
the database must send a number for each bit forming a column
(for the load balancing), or for each bit forming a residue (for
the recursion). By the usage of homomorphic encryption schemes,
the columns and residues can be encoded very efficiently. This
is specially important for recursion, as the factor resulting in an
exponential growth of the reply size is greatly reduced (nowadays
the reduction is of one thousand approximately).
In 2004, there was a rediscovery of Stern’s proposal [7], and a
proposition by Lipmaa [8] which is basically Stern’s construction
with the recently discovered length-flexible homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme of Damgärd and Jurik [18]. In his paper Lipmaa
twists Stern’s construction, taking profit of the length-flexible
cryptosystem to provide PIR schemes that are both practical and
asymptotically interesting. Lipmaa remarks that using correctly
this cryptosystem, it is possible to obtain a linear growth in the
server reply (instead of exponential) when using recursively the
PIR scheme. This greatly improves the versatility of the protocol
and leads to an asymptotic behavior much better than with any
of the previous schemes.
C. Adaptive predicate schemes
One year after Stern’s proposal, Cachin, Micali, and Stadler
presented a scheme [6] based on a new trapdoor predicate that
they called the φ-assumption. This predicate, just as being a
5QR or not, can encode just a single bit. Whereas this may
seem as a step backwards after Stern’s work on the usage of
homomorphic encryption schemes, it is not. The main reason is
that these trapdoor predicates have a very interesting property :
a user can create a compact generator, out of which the database
can obtain the numbers forming the query. Query size is thus
almost independent of the number of elements in the database
(growth is logarithmic), and even if the system is not practically
implementable2, when database size increases this approach beat
asymptotically all the PIR schemes published before it.
Fig. 6. Cachin Micali and Stadler’s scheme.
The basic idea in this scheme is to create first a number
generator which will be used locally by the database to obtain
a set of numbers, and afterwards create a trapdoor predicate such
that the number associated with the index interesting the user has
special properties (see figure 6).
This approach in fact has led recently to a very interesting vari-
ation. In 2005, Gentry and Ramzan presented a scheme [9], which
like Lipmaa’s scheme is practical and presents an asymptotical
improvement, even if for many applications Lipmaa’s construction
is better, as shown in the next section. In their paper, the authors
present a construction that generalizes the proposal of Cachin et
al., and their scheme can be implemented using a slight variation
of the φ-assumption. Aside from the generalization, two major
modifications are done with respect to the initial scheme. The
first modification is pretty much the same as Stern did with
respect to Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky’s scheme: modifying the
trapdoor predicate to encode more than a single bit. The second
modification is very simple and consists on using the same
numbers (which are associated with the database bits) for all the
queries. This is almost trivial, but was not proposed by Cachin
et al., and it allows to make very small queries that just describe
the predicates under which the desired numbers will have special
properties.
D. Trusted hardware schemes
The performance attainable with straightforward usage of
trusted hardware was analyzed by Smith and Safford in [12].
If the database has a trusted hardware device, such as a secure
coprocessor, retrieving an element of the database privately is
very simple. The user sends in an encrypted form the index of
the element he is interested in to the trusted hardware device. This
device reads locally the contents of the whole database, and stores
only the element the user wants. Finally, the trusted hardware
device encrypts the element and sends it back to the user. The
cost of such an operation is roughly the one of reading the entire
database as trusted hardware I/Os are really slow because of their
security constraints.
2 Queries are too large and the communication rate is too small for almost
any application.
Fig. 7. Pre-computation in Asonov and Freytag’s scheme.
An improvement is proposed by Asonov and Freytag in [13].
In this scheme, the trusted hardware device pre-computes an
encrypted permutation of the database as shown in figure 7. For
the first query sent to the database after the pre-computation, the
trusted hardware device just needs to read the encrypted element
in which the user is interested (as the database does not know
the permutation, it cannot learn which element is being retrieved)
and re-encrypt it (so that the user can decrypt the reply) before
sending it to the user.
When the database receives the second query after the pre-
computation, the trusted hardware device will have to read the
encrypted element retrieved for the first query plus another
element in order to hide from the database whether the second
query is for the same element than the first or not. Generally, to
avoid that the database may learn whether the same elements are
being retrieved or not on subsequent queries, the trusted hardware
must read for each of these queries all the elements already read
since the last pre-computation plus one, and of course re-encrypt
the requested entry.
The computational cost is therefore roughly linear in the
number of queries since the last pre-computation, instead of linear
on the database size. With this scheme a server will be able to
answer much quicker than with any other scheme to some PIR
requests before having to do a pre-computation again. However,
the pre-computation is very costly and therefore this scheme
is mostly adapted to small databases that change very scarcely
(as the pre-computation must be done every time the database
changes), receiving a small amount of queries.
A major issue with this approach is that user’s trust must
be placed on hardware tamper resistance but also on the entity
programming the device. This device cannot therefore be pro-
grammed by the server administrators, and a trusted third party is
required. Number-theory and noise-based approaches require no
trusted entities to step in at any time.
E. Noise-based schemes
Very recently, the authors proposed in [14] a new scheme
which difficulty is based on lattice scrambling, the same kind
of problems used for the NTRU scheme. In this protocol the user
has a local matrix generator from which it is possible to obtain
sets of matrices belonging to a secret lattice3. These matrices are
disturbed by the user by the introduction of noise in two thirds of
the matrices’ columns as shown in figure 8 to obtain respectively
softly disturbed matrices (SDMs) and hardly disturbed matrices
(HDMs).
To obtain an element from the database the user sends a set of
SDMs and one HDM (replacing respectively the QRs and QNR
3 A lattice is a vector space like algebraic structure.
6Fig. 8. Matrix perturbation.
in Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky’s scheme). The database inserts
each element in the corresponding matrix with a multiplicative
operation OP and sums all the rows of the resulting matrices
to obtain the database reply, a single noisy vector (see figure 9).
Using the unmodified columns of the matrices sent in the request,
the user is able to find the noise associated to the returned noisy
vector. If the soft noise multiplied by the total noise factor (which
is proportional to the number of elements in the database) is much
smaller than the hard noise, it can be filtered out and the user
can retrieve the information associated to the noise of the HDM
matrix.
Fig. 9. Noise-based approach.
This scheme has a communication performance not as good as
other schemes presented in this section, but all the operations
are multiplicative (instead of exponential) or additive (instead
of multiplicative) and no trusted hardware is used. As it will
be shown in the performance analysis, the computational cost
reduction is very significant, and in many cases reducing this
cost is imperative for the usability of a PIR protocol.
IV. COMMUNICATION PERFORMANCE
When querying a database without trying to hide which element
is being retrieved, a user sends the index of the entry he is
interested in and the database sends back the requested element.
Roughly, if the database has n elements, the query size will be
log(n) bits, and the reply expansion factor will be 1.
When using a PIR scheme, the reply expansion factor may
depend on the size of the element retrieved as information is
sent by chunks. Usually, a PIR reply has a given size and can
encode a fixed number of bits. If the database elements are smaller
than the chunk size the expansion factor will grow. For the sake
of readability we will not consider this case. To compare the
PIR schemes between them we will just present query size and
database reply expansion factor, supposing that database elements
are large enough. Trusted hardware schemes always have optimal
communication cost (query size is log(n) and reply expansion
factor is 1) and therefore they are not included in this comparison.
In table 10, the use of the recursive construction proposed
by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky is represented by a parameter
noted d, d = 1 meaning that no recursion is done. The integer
k represents a factorization-type security parameter, which for
practical applications should not be lower than 1024. We have
taken a different notation for Cachin et al.’s security parameter,
K, as the authors fixed K > log2(n), even if their only non-
factorizable integer had K5 bits. This gives a much stronger
constraint than k > log3(n), i.e., the usual asymptotic estimation
against factorization. The reason for this is that the constraint is
introduced to ensure the security of their number generator out
of which their query is formed by the database. As the security
assumptions done are different, we use different notations for the
security parameters. Finally, s represents an integer parameter that
can be fixed by the user. As it will be shown in section IV, the
computational cost of the schemes having this parameter is at
least in O((sk)2) per bit in the database and therefore s must be
kept close to one, in order to limit the computational cost. For
Aguilar and Gaborit’s scheme (noted hereafter AG), the parameter
N represents a security parameter for the lattice used, typically
N = 66, the parameter l0 represents the size in bits of the soft
error magnitude, it has a logarithmic relation with n, typically
l0 = 20.
The performance results presented in figure 10 for the scheme
proposed by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky (KO) are not exactly the
same as the ones presented in their paper. These authors stayed
with some load balancing, instead of pushing the recursive scheme
to its maximum level. This strategy has been abandoned on
current schemes and therefore to give a better comparison we have
provided the results for the maximum recursive scheme rather
than for the scheme with load balancing. Stern’s and Lipmaa’s
schemes can be implemented with various encryption algorithms.
The results presented in the table represent an implementation
with the Damgärd-Jurik cryptosystem, which is the most effective
and versatile homomorphic cryptosystem to date. Using Gentry
and Ramzan’s scheme (GR) recursively is not studied as this
scheme uses pre-computation (see end of section II-C). The
dimension d is therefore not indicated in the results associated
to this scheme. For Cachin et al. (CMS), we have not included
d in the performance results, since it was designed as a theoretic
scheme. The reason it has been included in figure 10 is to make
visible the impact on asymptotic performance resulting from the
innovations they introduced.
Indeed, the results illustrate the impact of the innovations
presented in the previous section. The drastic reduction of the
database reply expansion factor (specially when d > 1) that
can be observed between the first and the second lines is the
result of Stern’s introduction of chunk sizes greater than unity.
The dependence on n of query sizes in lines four and five
is just reduced to the asymptotic behavior expected for K,
which is the result of Cachin et al.’s approach of generating
the trapdoor predicates after defining the numbers forming the
queries. Lipmaa’s usage of length-flexible cryptosystems lowers
from geometric to linear the increase of Stern’s replies as d grows.
Finally, the possibility of retrieving more than one bit per reply,
and the replacement of Cachin et al.’s number generators by a
fixed set of numbers by Gentry and Ramzan, gives the first PIR
scheme with a communication cost independent of n and efficient
7in practice4.
Numerical values in figure 10 show that Gentry and Ramzan’s
scheme is the most communication efficient protocol. Queries are
very small and the reply expansion factor is only 4. However, if
database elements are large, Stern’s and Lipmaa’s should be used
as they have the lowest reply expansion factor. On the opposite
side, the noise-based approach is clearly less efficient from a
communication point of view, as either queries are really large
(396Mb for d = 1) or the database reply expansion factor becomes
much larger than the ones obtained with the other protocols (20
for d = 2).
V. COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE
The exact evaluation of computational complexity in PIR
schemes leads to difficult to analyze results. For this reason, we
give in this section simple lower bounds on this complexity to
represent the magnitude of the computational costs, accepting
a lost in accuracy for the sake of readability. Reply generation
will be the limiting factor for single-database PIR usage, we
will therefore not analyze the computational cost for the users
to generate a query and to decode a PIR reply.
Lipmaa’s and Stern’s schemes are clear improvements over the
scheme proposed by Kushilevitz and Ostrovsky and therefore we
will not present in this section the computational cost associated
to this scheme. For the same reason we will just present the
computational cost for the protocol proposed by Gentry and
Ramzan and not for the one initially proposed by Cachin et al. For
all of these schemes, reply generation cost is roughly a modular
multiplication per bit on the database.
Schemes based on trusted hardware require much less compu-
tation. In the scheme proposed by Smith and Safford (noted SS
hereafter), the cost of generating a reply is roughly the one of
reading the entire database for the trusted hardware device. With
Asonov and Freytag’s scheme (AF), the base computational cost
is reading an element of the database for the trusted hardware
device and it grows linearly in the number of queries since the
last pre-computation.
Figure 11 presents the computational costs of these schemes
in bit operations. All of the measures are given for l-bit database
elements. Pre-computation is done for a given database content.
If an element of the database changes, the computational cost
to update the database pre-computation is given by the update
on write measure. If this cost is given for a protocol it must be
multiplied by the number of elements that change, if no cost is
given it means that the pre-computation must be completely done
again every time any element changes in the database.
We have noted M(k) the cost of a k-bit modular multiplication,
and THR(l) the cost of reading l bits with a trusted hardware
device. The parameter α represents the number of queries treated
since the last pre-computation in Asonov and Freitag’s scheme.
As previously, k is a security parameter representing the length
of a hard-to-factor modulus, d the dimension of the database
representation, n the number of elements on the database, and
s an integer parameter of Damgärd and Jurik’s homomorphic
encryption scheme.
4In an asymptotic evaluation we must suppose k > O(log3(n)) [9].
Furthermore this scheme is based on the existence of enough prime numbers
lower than 2k/5, however for any practical parameters there is no need to
increase k above the factorization limit we have fixed. Indeed, if k = 1024,
the results presented here are valid for n < 1058.
Figure 12 presents the evaluation of these performance results.
When Stern’s or Lipmaa’s schemes are used the database reply
generation computational cost is a modular multiplication per
bit in the database. The size of the modulus will be 2048 bits
for current factorization standards and s = 1. With Gentry and
Ramzan’s scheme the cost will be a modular multiplication over
1365 bits per bit in the database. Finally, when Aguilar and
Gaborit’s scheme is used, the database must compute 32N ≃ 100
additions of 3l0 = 60 bits per bit in the database. Our Opteron
248 server can compute two hundred thousands 2048-bit modular
multiplications, four hundred thousands 1365-bit modular multi-
plications, and four billion 60 bit additions per second. For the
schemes based on trusted hardware, we will use the performance
results from [19] in which an IBM 4758 secure co-processor
is used. Last generation trusted hardware devices have a USB2
communication interface, however, due to obfuscation needs, the
I/O throughput is usually very low. In the case of the IBM 4758
this value is 1 Mbyte per second.
When comparing the closed formulas of figure 12, the first
important remark is that using trusted hardware without pre-
computation only improves the bandwidth a server can provide
by one order of magnitude when compared to number theory
schemes. On the other side, pre-computation in Asonov and
Freitag’s scheme allows a server to provide rapid replies to
PIR requests as long as the number of queries done between
each pre-computation is much smaller than n. Pre-computation is
theoretically in O(n
√
n), but the authors of this scheme assert that
experimentally it is closer to O(n). We have kept this optimistic
approach for the results even if it should be tested thoroughly
before acceptance. For a database of one thousand songs of
2 Mbytes each, the trusted hardware device needs roughly a
whole day of pre-computation. Pre-computation is therefore very
expensive, and this approach should only be used for small
non-volatile databases (to limit pre-computation time) with a
restricted number of queries per day (when α ≃ n the pre-
computation benefit is lost). With Gentry and Ramzan’s scheme,
pre-computation cost is roughly similar (14 hours), however two
major differences must be considered. First, updating the pre-
computation has a very moderate cost for medium size databases
(50 seconds per element changed). Second, the pre-computation
remains valid independently of the number of queries received.
This scheme’s pre-computation is therefore much less restrictive
than with Asonov and Fretag’s scheme. On the other side, pre-
computation for large databases is too costly. If the database had
one hundred thousand elements of 2Mb, pre-computation would
need 16 years (!).
The bandwidth attainable with the noise-based approach is one
order of magnitude larger than with Smith and Safford’s scheme
and between two and three times larger than with number theory
based schemes. However, it is important to keep in mind that
query sizes are large and therefore this scheme should not be
used to retrieve small elements from a database as the cost of
sending the query would not be amortized.
Numerical values in figure 12 show that the computational
cost is so large that, even for a medium size database, the
throughput a server can deliver with a PIR scheme using all of
his computational power is very limited. In the given example the
private retrieval will use at most 0.016 percent of a 10Mb ADSL
connection. Even with a database reply expansion factor of 1000
the bandwidth usage with a number-theory scheme would only
8be of 4 percent. Database reply expansion factor is therefore a
minor parameter and users should be careful not wasting other
resources to limit it.
Considering these results we can remark that Gentry and
Ramzan’s scheme is always a better choice than Stern’s or
Lipmaa’s schemes. Likewise, using the noise-based approach
with d = 2 will only induce a bandwidth usage of 8 percent.
Considering that with such an approach the user will download
the database elements at 40Kbits/s instead of 400bits/s (with
Gentry and Ramzan’s scheme), it comes out that the noise-based
approach leads to a much more usable scheme than the other
communication optimized approaches.
VI. USABILITY TRENDS
In this section we examine the usability of PIR, related to the
evolution of computational power and network bandwidth. These
two values follow respectively Moore’s law, which roughly stands
that computational power doubles every 18 months, and Nielsen’s
law, which stands that network bandwidth grows at least by 50%
every year [20].
Whether single-database PIR schemes are or will become
usable in real life applications is studied in [21]. In this paper
the authors compare the time needed to treat a database bit with
the time to send it. They remark that if treating a bit takes longer
than sending it, it is faster to send the whole database to the
user than to compute a PIR reply. They notice that nowadays
sending the database to a user with an Internet home connection
is ten times faster than computing a PIR reply with number theory
schemes. Moreover they prove that if Nielsen’s and Moore’s laws
are respected this will remain so in the future. Remark that the
presented noise-based scheme being one hundred times faster
than number theory schemes, this situation is inverted, and as
the results of this section will show it will remain so. However,
we believe that this measure is questionable for various reasons.
First, the database bandwidth used must be paid every month
while investing in computing power to lower the communication
costs may be done only once. The question is therefore not just
which is the faster but also which is the cheaper for the database
server.
Second, available bandwidth is a difficult to control factor. Of
course, if a server rental approach is used increasing the database
bandwidth is not a problem. On the other side, common users
have a maximum bandwidth which is fixed by their provider’s
technology and it is often not possible or very costly to multiply
the connection speed over this maximum. If server rental is not
possible and the database server is inside a company changing the
company’s network to upgrade its bandwidth can be a very costly
operation just as requesting the installation of landlines to scale
up the Internet bandwidth. In some cases, it is just impossible to
increase the bandwidth, for example if satellite communications
are used, or if situated in an isolated place etc. Computational
power on the other hand is very easy to increase, specially as
PIR schemes are easy to distribute.
We therefore prefer studying the evolution of the obtainable
throughput for the different schemes, and compare the results
between them. We discuss the absolute values as well as the
relative ones when compared to the evolution of the available
bandwidth. Finally, we study the evolution of bandwidth usage by
the PIR schemes to try to infer the importance of communication
efficiency in the future.
We saw that there were mainly three kinds of PIR schemes:
number theory based schemes, hardware schemes and the recent
noise-based schemes. To analyze the trends of the different
approaches, we have chosen the most versatile schemes of each
approach: Gentry and Ramzan’s for number theory, Smith and
Safford’s for trusted hardware, and Aguilar and Gaborit’s as an
example of what can be achieved with a noise-based approach.
The security parameter of a number theory scheme is the size
of an RSA modulus (or discrete log). The size officially advised
by international organism such as the NIST was 768 bits in 1995,
1024 bits until 2010, 2048 bits until 2030 and 3072 bits beyond
[22].
For trusted hardware schemes the situation is different since no
law predicts the evolution of their I/O bandwidth, which is the
major parameter for PIR performance. However, as obfuscation
through cryptographic operations is the origin of the limited
bandwidth in these devices, it is reasonable to suppose that
the relation between computational power and I/O bandwidth is
linear. We will therefore use Moore’s law to predict the evolution
of PIR performance with trusted hardware.
This prediction is less reliable than the ones realized for
number theory or noise-based schemes and the results presented
in this section for trusted hardware are merely indicative. In
any case, this approach is very different from the other two.
First, because this hardware is costly and usually not installed
on servers, and second because a trusted third party is needed
to install the software on it. Still, we believe that comparing the
other approaches’ performances to trusted hardware schemes is
interesting and therefore their performance prediction, even if less
reliable, has been included in this section.
The scheme we have presented to illustrate the performance
attainable with a noise-based approach has a security parameter
N related to the size of the matrices forming the PIR queries.
The presented results for communication and computational per-
formance correspond to a security parameter of N = 66, which
should increase in time. To preserve the same computational
complexity than the one obtained by NIST recommendations on
factorization we will set N = 66 until 2010, N = 80 until 2020
and N = 100 for 2030 and beyond.
Year 2007 2010 2020 2030 2040
Available bandwidth (bits/s) 10M 34M 1.9G 110G 6.3T
Throughput Number Theory 400 400 40K 1.8M 180M
(bits/s) Trusted Hardware 8K 32K 3.2M 320M 32G
Noise-Based 40K 120K 12M 1G 100G
Fig. 13. Throughput trends.
In figure 13, we give the evolution in time for n = 1000 of
the throughput that a user can obtain when retrieving privately
an element from a database. These results are linear in 1/n and
therefore it is easy to deduce the throughput for any other value
of n. The figure takes into account Moore’s law, Nielsen’s law
and size evolution of the security parameters.
Notice that noise-based schemes will improve their speed in
comparison to number theory schemes since the size of their key
increases slower (linear instead of quadratic). Trusted hardware
schemes’ speed increases even faster as we haven’t taken into
account the increase in obfuscation complexity on time. The
figure’s results show that the span of applications in which PIR
9protocols are usable will become larger and larger as throughput
will be able to handle large amounts of voice (2010s), high quality
audio (2020s) and video (2030s).
For databases with millions of elements, the throughput results
given in figure 13 are divided by one thousand. Similarly, if
simultaneous PIR queries are authorized, this throughput is to
be shared by all the users downloading from the database. This
must be taken into account when considering this section results.
For example, nowadays, a single user downloading privately a
2Mb song from a one thousand songs database would retrieve
it in 5 minutes roughly, using the presented noise-based scheme.
However, downloading in a few minutes a song from a one million
songs database in which one thousand users are sharing the server
throughput does not seem feasible with any existing protocol
before 2040.
The presented noise-based scheme’s throughput is between 100
and 1000 times larger than number theory schemes. The main
weakness of this scheme is the large size of the query (25Mb
for d = 2 and n = 1000). With a current 10Mb download /
1Mb upload connection, query time remains tolerable for medium
database sizes (25s for the given parameters), but is unacceptable
for large databases in many applications. For example, if n =
106, query size will be roughly 792Mb for d = 2, which implies
that the user will have to wait thirteen minutes (while the query
is being sent) before the download begins. However, FTTH is
already broadly used in Japan, and deployments are scheduled for
the coming years in Europe and North America. It seems therefore
reasonable to think that symmetric connections will generalize
and that query times will be very low even for very large databases
in the coming years.
Fig. 14. Relative throughput trends.
If PIR applications will probably rise, general use of these
protocols does not seem probable. Indeed, as shown in figure 14,
the obtainable throughput for a PIR scheme will remain a very
small fraction of the users’ bandwidth and therefore non-private
retrieval will remain much faster.
On the other hand, PIR schemes are highly parallelizable. Using
clusters of low-cost specialized hardware may rise the obtainable
throughput to values closer to non-private retrieval performances
at a moderated prize. Given the results of figure 14 for the noise-
based scheme, a card containing one hundred low-cost special-
ized units providing each the same throughput than a common
processor would suffice. For such a scheme, as operations are
additive, each unit would just have to contain simple multipliers
and mostly multiplexers. Number-theory schemes, would need ten
thousand specialized units providing each the same throughput
than a common processor, and each of these units would have to
be based on Montgomery multipliers and other costly hardware,
and therefore will lead to thousand of times more costly solutions.
This approach does neither seem possible with trusted hardware
given the high cost of these devices.
Finally, we consider the evolution of the trade-off between
communication and computation. If we multiply the results of
figure 14 by the expansion factors of the schemes used we obtain
the percent of bandwidth that the PIR protocols will need. Trusted
hardware and number theory schemes remain almost unchanged
and the noise-based scheme rises to an interval between eight
percent (nowadays) and forty percent (in 2040). It is important to
remark that this approach will remain the only one for which
there will be a reasonable trade-off between communication
and computation (that results in a throughput between 100 and
1000 times larger). Low communication expansion factors will
probably go on being useless as well for trusted hardware as
for number theory schemes as bandwidth usage will remain
insignificant for these approaches as shown in figure 14.
As a conclusion for this section we may say that time passing
by PIR will become usable for more and more applications.
However, if computational power and available bandwidth go
on following Nielsen’s and Moore’s laws, retrieving privately an
element from a database will be much slower than a non-private
retrieval, even for moderated size databases. Specialized hardware
may limit this gap, specially for an additive approach such as
the noise-based scheme we have presented. Whether specialized
hardware is used or not, the performance evolution shows that
a multiplicative (number theory) approach will severely limit the
applications on which PIR schemes are usable. Trusted hardware,
if not specially designed for this purpose does not seem to be a
solution either. Finding an additive solution, like the noise-based
approach, seems to be the best way to obtain one day good enough
performances for PIR usage generalization.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, after giving a precise analysis of the main ideas
used in the existing Single Database PIR schemes and techniques,
we have proposed a set of benchmarks of the different PIR
schemes in order to compare their efficiency. We have presented
three main approaches to obtain PIR schemes: number theory,
noise-based, and trusted hardware.
The number theory approach provides secure schemes and
relies on well known problems, but is very slow in practice and
results in difficult to use schemes for real life applications. The
trusted hardware schemes are faster, but the used devices are
costly, and a trusted third party is needed to program these de-
vices, which is incompatible with many applications. Eventually,
the noise-based approach provides an even faster scheme which,
on the other hand, needs the user to send large queries and whose
security relies on less studied problems.
The main advantage of the noise-based schemes is to be struc-
turally additive in comparison to number theory based protocols
which are multiplicative. Indeed, the performance analysis done in
this paper highlights that the multiplicative structure of number
theory schemes leads to throughputs that are and will remain
very low. The results we have presented show that a practical
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development of PIR schemes is related to the existence of faster
schemes like the one presented to illustrate the noise-based
approach, and more generally to the existence of structurally
additive schemes. Moreover, the drawbacks of this approach
should step down in time: queries should be sent in at most some
seconds for almost any database size as bandwidth growths, and
database reply expansion factor’s impact on bandwidth usage will
remain limited. The issues with number theory (multiplicative
schemes) and trusted hardware (cost and trust) are, on the other
hand, inherent to these approaches and will probably not fade in
time.
Although noise-based protocols are rather new for PIR, they
represent a very interesting alternative to number theory based
protocols, in the same way that lattice based protocols like NTRU
represents an alternative to number theory based cryptosystems.
In fact, they seem to be the only potential practical solution to
obtain a throughput close to the one of a non-private retrieval.
Meanwhile, like for the NTRU cryptosystem, their security re-
duction to well studied problems is not as straightforward as for
number theory based protocols.
To conclude, we ask the following questions: is it possible to
construct (additive) noise-based PIR protocols faster than the one
presented or which have a smaller query size ? Are there other
additive approaches to be explored to obtain rapid PIR schemes ?
We hope that this paper will motivate research in these fields to
obtain the performance improvement needed by PIR schemes to
be considered by the community as the real practical and useful
tools they can be instead of theoretical primitives.
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Approach Scheme Query size Reply expansion factor
Closed n = 1000 Closed
formula d = 1 d = 2 formula d = 1 d = 2
Homomorphic Trapdoors KO d× k × n 1d 1Mb 63Kb kd 1K 1M
Stern d× (s+ 1)× k × n 1d 2Mb 126Kb
`
s+1
s
´d
2 4
Lipmaa d×
“
s+ d+12
”
× k ×
“
n
1
d − 1
”
2Mb 126Kb
(s+d)
s 2 3
Adaptive Predicates CMS K4 + 2×K5 N/A K5 N/A
GR 8/3× k 3Kb 4
Noise-Based AG d× 3l0 × 32N
2 × n1/d 396Mb 25Mb 4.5d 4.5 20
Fig. 10. Communication performance comparison.
Approach Scheme Pre-computation Update on write Reply generation
Number Theory Stern&Lipmaa — — l × n × M((s+1) × k)
GR 2× l × k3 × n
2 2× l × k3 × n l × n × M(4/3 × k)
Trusted Hardware SS — — THR(l × n)
AF THR(l × n1.5) — THR(l × (α+ 1))
Noise-based AG — — l × n× 3l0 × 32N
Fig. 11. Computation performance comparison.
Approach Scheme Pre-computation (sec) Update on write (sec) Reply generation (bits/s)
Closed formula
n = 1000
l = 2MB Closed formula
n = 1000
l = 2MB Closed formula n = 1000
Number Theory Stern&Lipmaa — — — —
2×105
n
200
GR
l×n
2
3×108 50K
l×n
3×108 50
4×105
n
400
Trusted Hardware SS — — — —
8×106
n
8K
AF
l×n
2×105 80K — —
8×106
(α+1)
8M
(α+1)
Noise-based AG — — — —
4×107
n
40K
Fig. 12. Computation performance comparison.
